Xiang Liu received the B.Sc. degree from the Dalian University of Technology and the Ph.D. degree from the Southeast University. He is currently the postdoc of Chinese University of Hong Kong and Southeast University. His main research interests include algorithmic game theory, auction mechanism design, multi-agent system and reinforcement learning. He has published several articles in international conference proceedings and journals, such as AIJ、JSAC、TMC、AAAI、IJCAI.
刘翔，博士。2016年在大连理工大学获得网络工程专业学士学位，在2023年获得东南大学计算机科学与技术专业博士学位。目前是东南大学和香港中文大学博士后。研究兴趣主要包括博弈论、拍卖机制设计、多智能体系统、强化学习等。在相关领域的国际顶级会议与期刊上（包括AIJ、JSAC、TMC、AAAI、IJCAI等）发表论文10余篇，并且担任AAAI、IJCAI等多个国际会议的PC member。(个人主页)
欢迎对博弈论、拍卖理论、机制设计、Multi-armed Bandit在线学习算法、多智能体强化学习等方向感兴趣的同学报考我的硕士研究生！欢迎对科研有钻研精神的本科生加入我们实验室！
Algorithmic game theory
Auction mechanism design
Multi-agent system
Reinforcement learning
2016.9-2023.7 东南大学，计算机科学与工程学院，工学博士
2012.9-2016.6 大连理工大学，网络工程，工学学士
2023.11-至今，东南大学计算机科学与工程学院，至善博士后
主持国家自然科学青年基金（2025-2027），江苏省自然科学青年基金（2024-2026）
Liu Xiang, Chan Hau, Li Minming, Wu Weiwei. (2024). Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey (IJCAI). CCF A
Liu Xiang, Qin Yifan, Wu Weiwei, Fu Chenchen, Lyu Yan, Dong Fang, Luo Junzhou. (2023). B2-bandit: Budgeted pricing with blocking workers in crowdsourcing under uncertainty. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC). JCR Q1, CCF A, Impact Factor: 16.4
Liu Xiang, Chan Hau, Li Minming, Wu Weiwei, Zhao Yingchao. (2023). Budget-feasible mechanisms for proportionally selecting agents from groups. Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), 323, 103975. JCR Q1, CCF A, Impact Factor: 14.4
Liu Xiang, Chan Hau, Li Minming, Wu Weiwei. (2021). Budget-feasible mechanisms for representing groups of agents proportionally. In Proceedings of the 27th international joint conference on artificial intelligence (IJCAI) (pp. 313–320). CCF A
Liu Xiang, Wu Weiwei, Li Minming, Wang Wanyuan. (2021). Budget feasible mechanisms over graphs. In Proceedings of the aaai conference on artificial intelligence (AAAI) (Vol. 35, pp. 5549–5556). CCF A
Liu Xiang, Fu Chenchen, Wu Weiwei, Li Minming, Wang Wanyuan, Chau Vincent, Luo Junzhou. (2022). Budget-feasible mechanisms in two-sided crowdsensing markets: Truthfulness, fairness, and efficiency. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing (TMC), (01), 1–18. JCR Q1, CCF A, Impact Factor: 7.9
Wu Weiwei, Liu Xiang (Corresponding Author), Li Minming (2018). Budget-feasible procurement mechanisms in two-sided markets. In Proceedings of the 27th international joint conference on artificial intelligence (IJCAI) (pp. 548–554). CCF A
Liu Xiang, Wu Weiwei, Li Minming, Wang Wanyuan. (2020). Two-sided auctions with budgets: Fairness, incentives and efficiency. In Proceedings of the 19th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems (AAMAS) (pp. 1907–1909). CCF B
Liu Xiang, Wu Weiwei, Wang Wanyuan, Xu Yuhang, Wang Xiumin, Cui Helei. (2023). Budget-feasible sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing. Theoretical Computer Science. CCF B
Xu Yuhang, Wang Wanyuan, Xiong Guangwei, Liu Xiang (Corresponding Author), Wu Weiwei, Liu Kai. (2021). Network-flow-based efficient vehicle dispatch for city-scale ride-hailing systems. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems (TITS). JCR Q1, CCF B, Impact Factor: 8.5
Liu Xiang, Wu Weiwei, Wang Wanyuan, Xu Yuhang, Wang Xiumin, Cui Helei. (2022). Budget-feasible sybil-proof mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing. In International joint conference on theoretical computer science (IJTCS).
Huang Ziyao, Wu Weiwei, Fu Chenchen, Liu Xiang, Shan Feng, Wang Jianping, Xu Xueyong. (2023). Communication-topology preserving motion planning: Enabling static routing in uav networks. ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN). JCR Q1, CCF B, Impact Factor: 4.1
Che Qian, Jiang Yichuan, An Bo, Wang Wanyuan, Liu Xiang. (2023). Structural credit assignment-guided coordinated mcts: An efficient and scalable method for online multiagent planning. In International conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems (AAMAS). CCF B
Wu Biwei, Zhu Xiaoxuan, Liu Xiang, Jin Jiahui, Xiong Runqun, Wu Weiwei. (2021). Revenue maximization of electric vehicle charging services with hierarchical game. In International conference on wireless algorithms, systems, and applications (WASA) (pp. 417–429). Springer, Cham. CCF C
ACM南京分会优秀博士论文，2024
东南大学优秀博士论文，2024
